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STUDENT NOTES
COMPARISON OF THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY
OF INFANTS
In dealing with infants the law sets up different standards and
imposes different measures of liability in negligent tort and criminal
cases. It is the purpose of this note to discuss this difference
between the tort and the criminal liabilities of infants.
In civil negligence cases there are no arbitrary age limits at
which an infant is conclusively presumed to be incapable of being
negligent or a limit under majority at which the presumption of
incapacity is removed, but, rather, the infant is held to that standard
of care which a reasonable child of his age, experience and intelligence would exercise under similar circumstances. Age here is
not the controlling element but it is to be considered by the jury
along with the general characteristics of the infant in determining
the class into which the infant should be placed. After the infant's
class has been determined in the light of his general characteristics,
the jury decides whether the defendant infant has exercised that
degree of care that might fairly and reasonably be expected of an
infant in his class under similar circumstances.'
The criminal law, however, presumes capacity or incapacity to
commit a crime according to set age limits. Under the age of
seven years an infant may not be convicted of a criminal offense.,
He is conclusively presumed to be incapable of entertaining a
criminal intent or having capacity to commit a crime, and no evidence of actual intent may be shown. It is stated in State v. Aaron:
"It is perfectly settled that an infant within the age of seven
years cannot be punished for any capital offense, whatever
circumstances of mischievous intention may be proved against
him for by the presumption of the law he cannot have discretion
to discern between good and evil and against this presumption no
averment can be admitted."
The age limit has been set by statute in many states and varies in
some from the common law age of seven.4
I'Note (1941) 29 Ky. L. J. 334.
2 1 Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed. 1932) 126; 1 Hale, P. C. 27,
an infant under 7 was pardoned after being indicted for homicide;
Clark & Marshall, Criminal Law, (3rd ed. 1927) 114.
'1 Russell, Crimes (7th ed. 1853) 2; State v. Aaron, 4 N. J. L.
263, 4271, 7 Am. Dec. 592, 596 (1818).
fDove v. State, 37 Ark. 261 (1881) (age 12); Ford v. State, 100
Ga. 63, 25 S. E. 845 (1896) (age 10); Angelo v. People, 96 1ll. 209
(1880) (age 10).
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Between the ages of seven and fourteen years an infant is prima
facie deemed to be incapable of committing a crime.' This presumption diminishes as the infant nears fourteen as there is a vast
difference between a child a day over seven and one a day under
fourteen. To convict an infant between these two ages the evidence
of malice or the capacity to discern between good and evil which
supplies age ought to be strong and clear beyond all doubt of contradiction
If actual malice is proved, or it is proved that the infant
can discern between good and evil, his lack of age will not save him.'
It has been held that a sense of moral guilt in the absence of a knowledge of the legal responsibility of his wrongful act will not authorize
conviction.'
In McCormack v. State." the court says:
"The inquiry is, not whether the accused is of the average
capacity of infants of his years, or above or below it. That he
is the one or the other is doubtless a fact which the jury ought
to consider in determining whether he had the knowledge and
discretion requisite to legal accountability. It is the strength of
the understanding and judgment of the delinquent which is in
issue, and which the jury are to consider. The presumption of
immunity proceeds, we suppose, on the theory that the infant is
of the average capacity of one of his years; and the inquiry for
the jury is whether it is clearly shown that in the particular
transaction, intelligently, he intended the doing of a wrongful
act. If this be clearly shown the presumption is repelled, and
legal accountability attaches."
After fourteen the presumption of incapacity is removed, and an
infant between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one has no immunity
because of his age but is equally subject to punishment as an adult."
'Russell,

op. cit. supra n. 3; Clark & Marshall (3rd ed. 1927)

114.

,McCormack v. State, 102 Ala. 156, 15 So. 438 (1894); Law v.
Commonwealth, 75 Va. 885 (1881) (dictum).
' Archbold's Criminal Pleading (13th ed. 1938) 12; Reg. v. Vamplew, 3 F & F 521, 176 Eng. Rep. 234 (1862); Angelo v. People, 96 Ill.
209 (1880); Law v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 885 (1881).
81 Hale, P. C. 27 (an infant of 8 was found guilty of murder and
hanged); 1 Hale, P. C. 25 (an infant of between 8 and 9 was found
guilty of having burned a barn with malice and cunning and was
hanged); 1 Hale, P. C. 26 (a boy of 10 killed his companion and hid
himself. He was hanged upon the ground that by his hiding he
showed he could discern good from evil); Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala.
323, 70 Am. Dec. 494 (1858); Broadnax v. State, 100 Ga. 62, 25 S. E.
844 (1896); State v. Goin, 9 Humph. 175 (Tenn. 1848).
'Willet v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush 230 (Ky. 1877) (dictum);
State v. Yeargan 117 N. C. 706, 23 S. E. 153 (1895).
" McCormack v. State, 102 Ala. 156, 15 So. 438 (1894).
11 Wharton, Criminal Law (10th ed. 1896) 85; 1 Hale, P. C. 25;
Berry v. State, 209 Ala. 120, 95 So. 453 (1923); McCutcheon v. State,
199 Ind. 245, 155 N. E. 544 (1927); People v. Teller, 1 Sheel Cr. 231
(N. Y. 1823).
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It is immaterial whether the infant over fourteen years of age actually
had knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act or was able to discern
good from evil, as far as the presumption of the law goes.'
There are very few criminal cases where an infant is charged
with criminal negligence. Perhaps this is due to a hesitancy to prosecute or a reluctance of juries to convict infants for crimes involving
negligence; and also a failure of these cases to reach appellate tribunals. There are a few cases where an infant has been charged
with a crime in which a high degree of negligence takes the place of
malice. The rule as to negligent crimes is essentially the same as the
rule for crimes involving intent, i.e. under the age of seven there is no
liability; between the ages of seven and fourteen there is a presumption of incapacity which may be removed by affirmative proof that
the defendant has capacity or knowledge and understanding of the
act and its wrongfulness; and after fourteen the presumption of
incapacity is removed.

In Watson et al. v. Commonwealth," the defendants, ages thirteen
and eleven, were swimming with the decreased when they pushed
him into deep water, knowing that he could not swim. The deceased
drowned and the defendants were tried and convicted of manslaughter. This conviction was reversed. The court said that: "To
seize one, whom you know to be unable to swim and against his will
intentionally to pull or push him into water known to be of such
depth he will have to swim or drown, and he is drowned thereby, or
in reckless disregard of human life intentionally and recklessly to
pull or push one into water of such depth he will have to swim or
drown, and he is drowned thereby, is homicidal." But in view of the
defendants ages as between seven and fourteen, and with the presumption in their favor that they were innocent of evil intent, the
court should have instructed that unless the jury believed beyond a
reasonable doubt that when the defendants did the act they had a
guilty knowledge that they were doing wrong they should be
acquitted.'
'McCutcheon v. State, 199 Ind. 247, 155 N. E. 544 (1927), (defendant, age sixteen, was tubercular, mentally weak and deficient,
morally delinquent, and a moron who was emotionally unstable; but
he was condemned to die for murder). Angelo v. People, 96 Ill. 209
(1880) (dictum).
,247 Ky. 336, 57 S. W. (2d) 39, (1933).
"In People v. Squazza, 81 N. Y. S. 254 (1903), an infant of eleven
threw a brick from the roof of a building, striking and killing a child
below. The defendant was indicted for first degree manslaughter
and convicted. The conviction was reversed because the presumption of incapacity due to the defendant's age was not removed by
proof that he had capacity to understand the act which he had done.
State v. Milholland, 89 Iowa 5, 56 N. W. 403 (1893) (defendant,
age thirteen, was convicted of manslaughter for having thrown a
companion into deep water where he drowned. There was no evidence that the defendant acted through anger or ill will but the conviction was affirmed. The court held that an instruction to the jury
that they were to consider the defendant's age and all the circum-
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The criminal law, unlike the civil law, places strong emphasis
upon age. Age limits are set under which an infant may not be held
criminally liable, between which the presumption of incapacity is
rebuttable, and a final limit under majority at which all presumption
of incapacity is removed and the infant is placed in the same position
as an adult.
It is submitted that this difference in the criminal and civil rules
results in a greater liability under the age of seven in civil cases
than in criminal cases. There is about the same liability in crimes
or in tort between the ages of seven and fourteen. And after the age
of fourteen there is a greater liability in criminal cases than in civil
ones.
For example: X, an extremely intelligent boy of six and one-half
years of age, has been taught something of the use of firearms. He
handles a loaded gun in such a negligent manner that it is discharged
and kills Y, the husband of Z. Z sues X for the wrongful death of her
husband through X's negligence. A jury finds that X has not exercised the degree of care that might reasonably and fairly be expected
of a child of X's age, intelligence, and experience under the circumstances and renders a verdict against X for his tort. But X cannot
be held criminally because he is under the age of seven and conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing a crime. Nor may
X's superior capacity be shown in the evidence to overcome the presumption of incapacity."
Between the ages of seven and fourteen the criminal and civil
rules are substantially the same as to capacity. An infant's liability
would depend upon whether he had acted with that degree of care
which might reasonably be expected of a child of his age, experience,
and intelligence. He would be presumed to be incapable of committing a crime but the presumption is rebuttable and if his actual capacity were shown he might be held liable.
After the infant reaches the age of fourteen all presumption of
incapacity is removed and he is criminally responsible in the same
manner as an adult. However, civily he is not held to the standard
of care of an adult but it is left to the jury to determine his responsibility by what might fairly be expected of an infant possessing the
equivalent of the defendant's age, intelligence, and experience.
The harsher criminal rule after the age of fourteen, in effect,
holds the infant to adult responsibility, in that the infant is presumed
to be as fully capable of distinguishing right from wrong as an adult.
stances, sufficiently presented the question of the defendant's capacity). State v. Peterson, 153 Minn. 310, 190 N. W. 345 (1922) (defendant, sixteen, killed a man while driving an automobile in a culpably
negligent manner. In affirming his conviction of second degree manslaughter, the court said the offense rested upon a statute but at the
same time said there was no lack of knowledge or understanding in
the defendant and that he was mature for his age. It held that the
trial court was correct in refusing an instruction that the jury should
consider the defendant's age).
15See n. 2 supra.
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The civil rule, however, results in the presumption that the infant is
not capable of exercising the same discretion as an adult or acting as
a reasonably prudent man until he reaches majority.
It is the opinion of the writer that the criminal rule is too harsh
in applying an adult standard after the infant reaches the age of
fourteen. The infant may be able to distinguish good from evil at
an earlier age than he is able to distinguish the wise from the unwise,
but, it remains, an infant of fourteen is immature as to knowledge
of legal right and wrong as well as to discretion. Especially in
crimes involving negligence, this rule works a hardship upon the
infant for in these instances he has no intention of accomplishing
the wrongful act but does so by his failure to exercise the proper
discretion.
Not all infants of the same age are capable of exercising the same
degree of care or able to distinguish right from wrong in an equal
degree. Arbitrary age limits are artificial and do not serve the purpose of justice. In civil cases it is recognized that chronological age
is a poor standard in determining an infant's capacity to be negligent and that it is far more just to consider the infant's general
characteristics, only one of which is age. If age limits are not conclusive in determining an infant's capacity to be negligent in cases
where only his tort liability is involved, a fortiori they should not be
used in criminal cases where their use results in the unjust protection
of the intelligent infant under seven years of age and the unjust
punishment of the dull infant over fourteen. It would be better to
leave the question of the infant's accountability to the jury to decide
in the light of what might fairly and reasonably be expected of an
infant of the defendant's age, intelligence, experience, and general
capacity. This would make the tort and the criminal rule the same.
MARY LOUISE BARTON

NEGLIGENCE: THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
Not infrequently in the study of law, one finds situations in the
field of negligence in which a different standard of care is employed

to determine liability in civil and in criminal cases.

It is the pur-

pose of this note to compare the standards of care required of physicians and surgeons in the two fields. Do the courts, in the prosecution of a physician or surgeon or one assuming to act as such, judge
the prisoner by the same objective standard that is used to deter-

mine his civil liability, or is a different standard used?
Tort liability of a physician is measured by the following
standard: A physician or surgeon is required to exercise the degree
of care ordinarily exercised by average members of the profession

